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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
is a fugitive.2 The mode in which fugitives are to be arrested,
brought before the governor and surrendered pursuant to requisi-
tion is prescribed by statute.3 Before surrendering a person, it is
the duty of the governor to determine whether or not he is a
fugitive from the demanding state.- For the wrongful institution
of such proceedings, the authorities hold that an action for malicious
prosecution will lie.5 Similarly, actions in the nature of malicious
prosecution have been maintained for the abuse of a search warrant,6
of an injunction order 7 of a warrant of attachment.8 It has also
been held in other jurisdictions that the termination of the original
criminal prosecution is not a condition precedent to the maintenance
of the action for the malicious abuse of the process.9 These hold-
ings, as the Court well demonstrated, are sound in principle, and the
holdings were based more upon a desire to do substantial justice than
upon fine distinctions between actions for malicious prosecution and
actions for the malicious abuse of process.
PARTNERSHIP-FIRM PROPERTY-STOCK ExCHANGE SEAT.-Father
and son, as partners, conducted a banking and brokerage business
from 1899 to 1901. With money given him by his father, the son had
purchased a seat on the New York Stock Exchange. Upon the
father's death in 1901, the son formed a new partnership with a
younger brother. The firm name was continued and the same set
of books was used. Under the new articles, the firm agreed to
pay $3600 per annum "as compensation for and in consideration of
the contribution to the firm of the entire and exclusive benefit of
the membership in the New York Stock Exchange." Through this
membership the firm was enabled to execute orders upon the Ex-
change. After a number of years of trading, the firm encountered
difficulties in the post-war period and finally made an assignment for
the benefit of creditors. A petition in bankruptcy shortly followed
and, in due course, both the partnership and the individual members
were adjudicated bankrupts. The individual in whose name the Ex-
change membership stood, had, prior to the failure, misappropriated
substantial sums in securities entrusted to him by a testamentary
trustee and a charitable corporation. It developed that the Stock
Exchange seat constituted the greater part of the assets. The seat
'U. S. Const. Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, as supplemented by the Act of 1793,
1 Stat. L., 302, now embodied in U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 5278, 5279.
'N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 827, 828.
"Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U. S. 52, 56 (1921); McNichols v. Pease,
supra, note 1,108; N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 827.
Johnson v. Corrington, 7 Ohio Dec. 572 (1878); Malone v. Belcher,
216 Mass. 209, 103 N. E. 637 (1913); Cardival v. Smith, 109 Mass.
158 (1872).
'Boeger v. Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390, 11 S. WA. 223 (1889).
'Powell v. Woodbury, 85 Vt. 504, 83 Atl. 541 (1912); Mark v,
Hyatt, 135 N. Y. 306, 31 N. E. 1099 (1892); Rieger & Co. v. Knight,
128 Md. 189, 97 AtI. 358 (1916).
8 Lawrence v. Hagerman, 56 Ill. 68 (1870); Brand v. Hinchman,
68 Mich. 590, 36 N. W. 664 (1888).
'Spangler v. Booze, 103 Va. 276, 49 S. E. 42 (1904); Zinn v. Rice,
154 Mass. 1, 27 N. E, 772 (1891).
RECENT DECISIONS
was sold and the proceeds claimed by creditors of the firm and by
the two parties defrauded by the individual. Held, that the seat was
the personal property of the individual member and that the pro-
ceeds of the sale should be allocated as an asset of his personal
estate. In re Amy et aL, 21 Fed. (2d) 301 (C. C. A. 2nd 1927).
Judge Swan, writing for the Circuit Court, gave full efficacy to
the apparent intent of the parties to the second partnership agree-
ment. Nowhere in the books nor in the articles of agreement was
found evidence that the membership was a capital contribution. The
payment of the annual compensation based upon a fixed valuation of
the seat could not well be regarded as interest upon a capital con-
tribution, for if the value of the seat were added to that of the
other capital furnished by its owner, the apparent effort made in
the articles to co-ordinate the extent of profit-sharing with capital
contribution would necessarily be disregarded. Neither could the
payment, in the first instance, of the carrying charges of the seat
be properly held indicative of such contribution, for it was found that
these sums were later charged to the member's personal account.
Nor did the Court consider as expressive of the true intent of the
parties the inclusion of the seat among the partnership assets in the
sworn inventory filed in the state insolvency proceeding. Further,
the fact that the trustee in bankruptcy (an attorney long familiar
with the firm's affairs and the draftsman of the partnership agree-
ment) had mingled the firm and individual assets should not be
deemed of controlling influence.
Generally, courts in determining the ownership of alleged firm
property endeavor to give effect to the true intent of the parties,
unless in so doing the rights of third parties would unduly suffer.'
The law presumes ownership in the individual where title is taken
in his name rather than in that of the firm.2 This presumption may
not be rebutted by evidence that the property was used by the firm,3
but by evidence that it was bought with partnership funds or treated
in the accounts as firm property. 4 In short, in the absence of an
agreement more or less definite, one must look to the conduct of
the parties, the indicator of their intention. The decision of the
Circuit Court, when analyzed, it is believed will be found in accord
with well recognized legal principles and more representative of
sound legal reasoning than the determinations of the referee and
the court below.5
'30 Cyc. 432.
2 Darrow v. Calkins, 154 N. Y. 503, 49 N. E. 61 (1897),
"Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 44 Super. Ct. (N. Y.) 116 (1878).
'Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224 (1892).
'It might be interesting to note that shortly after the rendition of
the Circuit Court's decision the New York Stock Exchange joined with
certain of the appellees in moving for an order directing the trustee
in bankruptcy to apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari,
the Exchange desiring a high court ruling upon a question deemed by it
of prime importance to those dealing with Stock Exchange firms. The
District Court, after a thorough review of the record, denied the
motion, saying that the carefully considered opinion of the Circuit Court
left no doubt in its mind as to the correct disposition of the matter.
(See memorandum, Winslow, D. f., 9/19/27, endorsed on motion papers.)
